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Abstract
This paper gives money a role in providing cheap collateral in a model of banking; besides the Taylor
Rule, monetary policy can affect the risk-premium on bank lending to firms by varying the supply of
M0, so at the zero bound monetary policy is effective; fiscal policy crowds out investment via the risk-
premium. A rule for making M0 respond to credit conditions can enhance the economy’s stability. Both
price-level and nominal GDP targeting rules for interest rates combined with this stabilise the economy
further. With these rules for monetary control, aggressive and distortionary regulation of banks’ balance
sheets becomes redundant.
Keywords: DSGE model; Financial Frictions; Crises; Indirect Inference; money supply; QE; monetary
policy; fiscal multiplier; zero bound
JEL classification: E3; E44; E52; C1;
The financial crisis of 2007—2011 has challenged our previous understanding of the monetary system, with
its assumptions that asset markets are complete and that money injections work solely through the setting
of interest rates on safe short-term government bonds. Instead it now seems more promising to assume
that financial assets, and specifically bonds and credit, are imperfect substitutes and that money substitutes
with a wide variety of financial and real assets in rather different ways; in such a world we can find a role
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for Quantitative Easing (QE) – Open Market Operations – that has now become a major instrument of
monetary policy. This world harks back to that of Friedman’s Quantity Theory restatement (Friedman,
1956) and Brunner and Meltzer’s papers on the banking system (e.g. Brunner and Meltzer, 1963) as a
transmission mechanism for money.
In this paper our aim is to construct a DSGE model in which this imperfect substitution occurs between
financial assets and in which therefore money has a role beyond merely setting the interest rate on short-
term government bonds, ‘bank rate’ for short. To do this we borrow from available models of the economy,
banking and collateral to create out of them what could be called a ‘neo-monetarist’ model. Another element
we inject is the possibility of hitting the zero bound on the bank rate; we do this quite simply by suspending
the Taylor Rule when bank rate solves for this level or below and replacing it with this exogenous lower
bound; this does not undermine inflation determinacy because this situation cannot continue indefinitely
since the shocks to interest rates must die out in time. We test this model against the key features of US
macroeconomic data and compare its performance with other models that do not have these new elements;
we find that our augmented model gets somewhat closer to the data’s behaviour.
The model has clear welfare and policy implications. In the economy there are two main interest rates,
the safe rate on short-term bonds and the risky rate on bank credit. The first regulates consumption,
while the second regulates investment. From a welfare viewpoint one may consider the first as designed
to smooth consumption, while the credit premium should be smoothed at its friction-minimising level and
the instrument that can do this is the monetary base (QE) which provides (monetary) collateral for banked
investment projects.
There is also a role for regulation in this model, that is parallel with QE: it too may be used to stabilise
the credit-premium, by loosening regulation when credit is expensive and vice versa. However, it can only
have such a role if in steady state regulation is pitched at a distorting level, to raise the credit premium above
its optimal, no-friction, rate; in this case, regulation can be lowered when the credit premium is high (in a
downturn) and raised when it is low (in an upturn). This cannot however be optimal because the steady
state intervention is distorting. If the steady state level is pitched at a non-distorting level, then regulation
can only be raised to offset a falling credit premium; it cannot be lowered any further with any effect since
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it is having no effect already.
Plainly, this would not be a problem if there was some other reason to set regulation at some high level –
e.g. to prevent future banking crises. Yet we show later in this paper that banking alone cannot create crises
according to this model; crises require non-banking shocks and banking shocks merely contribute to some
worsening of crises when they happen. This points to the need for stabilising policies that are non-distortive,
in the face of all such shocks; it does not justify distortive regulation unless such policies cannot do the job.
Yet we also show later that monetary policy is a powerful stabiliser when augmented to include the use of
the monetary base.
Finally, once money is introduced in the way we have done here, fiscal policy no longer has a strong effect
with a fixed money supply even when the zero bound knocks out the Taylor Rule. The fiscal multiplier is
the same whether interest rates are at the zero bound or not. The reason is that fiscal policy crowds out
investment via the credit premium even though the safe interest rate does not move.
Thus our aim in this paper is to bring data to bear on the important policy issues identified here through
the means of an estimated and tested DSGE model of the US economy. We are aware that there are
other ways to bring data to bear on these issues: thus generalised VAR estimation may show the effects of
different sorts of factors – as Stock and Watson (2012) – and the narratives of the economic history of
the Great Recession may also shed light. Nevertheless these ways have their own drawbacks; the difficulties
of identifying structural shocks in VARs and the possibilities of subjective bias in narrative both put limits
on these methods; it is not easy to refute or confirm any causal processes they suggest. If we turn to
alternative ways of estimating and testing this model structurally, we could have used Bayesian methods
with strong priors which then dominate the results but the difficulty here lies in the selection of such priors
when controversy surrounds most elements in our model; we could have chosen flat priors and thus moved
to pure Maximum Likelihood estimation but here the problem is rather flat likelihood surfaces under small
samples with these models (Canova and Sala, 2009), small-sample estimation bias, and rather weak power in
the resulting Likelihood Ratio tests (Le et al, 2014). The strength of the indirect inference method we will
be using is that we can identify a particular model, and, even though this model is highly nonlinear because
of the zero bound switch, estimate it with only minor bias and perform a test that has substantial power.
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Thus we can be challenged by the normal methods of science in future work. Meanwhile our model has clear
implications which we can use for policy analysis.
In the rest of this paper we begin by describing the new model; in section 2 we explain our testing
procedure; in section 3 we test the model against the key data features; in section 4 we look at its policy
and other implications along the lines just discussed; section 5 concludes.
1 The model
Our starting point in this paper is the work of Le et al. (2011) in finding a version of the Smets and
Wouters (2007, SW) model of the US that could fit key US data features from the early 1980s. This New
Keynesian model, which largely follows the specification of Christiano et al. (2005), is widely considered
to get reasonably close to US data; as is familiar, it embodies habit-persistence for consumers, adjustment
costs in capital, variable capacity utilisation, price/wage setting via Calvo contracts plus indexation and a
Taylor Rule setting interest rates. Le et al. nevertheless found that further modifications were necessary to
get it to replicate US data features. They showed that the original New Keynesian (NK) model was rejected.
In addition, they examined an alternative version in which prices and wages were fully flexible but there
was a simple one-period information delay for labour suppliers. This ‘New Classical (NC)’ version was also
rejected. They also proposed a hybrid model that merged the NK and NC models by assuming that wage
and price setters find themselves supplying labour and intermediate output partly in a competitive market
with price/wage flexibility, and partly in a market with imperfect competition. They assumed that the size
of each sector depended on the facts of competition and did not vary in the sample but they allowed the
coverage of imperfect competition to differ between labour and product markets. The basic idea was that
economies consist of product sectors where rigidity prevails and others where prices are flexible, reflecting
the degree of competition in these sectors. Similarly with labour markets; some are much more competitive
than others. An economy may be more or less dominated by competition and therefore more or less flexible
in its wage/price-setting. The price and wage setting equations in the hybrid model are assumed to be a
weighted average of the corresponding NK and NC equations.
It turned out that this combined model got much closer to the data for the full sample, when the rigidity
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was quite limited. Essentially, the NK model generated too little nominal variation while the NC model
delivered too much. However the hybrid model was able to reproduce the variances of the data; and it is this
key feature that enables it to match the data behaviour overall more closely. Further changes were made by
Le et al. (2013) to incorporate a banking sector, following Bernanke et al. (BGG, 1999).
With this addition the model divides the production side into three distinct participants: as in SW,
retailers and intermediate goods producers (now called entrepreneurs for a reason described later) and in
addition, capital producers. Retailers function in the same way as before, operating in perfect competition to
produce final goods by aggregating differentiated intermediate products using the Dixit-Stiglitz technology.
With the assumption that retail output is made up of a fixed proportion of intermediate goods in an
imperfectly competitive market and intermediate goods sold competitively, the aggregate price is a weighted
average of prices received in the two types of market. As a result, the aggregate price equation is unchanged.
Capital producers operate in a competitive market and take prices as given. They buy final consumption
goods and transform them into capital to be sold on to entrepreneurs.
The difference of BGG from SW lies in the nature of entrepreneurs. They still produce intermediate
goods, but now they do not rent capital from households (who do not buy capital but only buy bonds or
deposits) but must buy it from capital producers and in order to buy this capital they have to borrow from
a bank which converts household savings into lending. On their production side, entrepreneurs face the
same situation as in Le et al. (2011). They hire labour from households for wages that are partly set in
monopolistic, partly in competitive labour markets; and they buy capital from capital producers at prices
of goods similarly set in a mixture of monopolistic and competitive goods markets. Thus the production
function, the labour demand and real marginal cost equations are unchanged. It is on their financing side
that there are major changes. Entrepreneurs buy capital using their own net worth, pledged against loans
from the bank, which thus intermediates household savings deposited with it at the risk-free rate of return.
The net worth of entrepreneurs is kept below the demand for capital by a fixed death rate of these firms
(1 − θ); the stock of firms is kept constant by an equal birth rate of new firms. Entrepreneurial net worth
therefore is given by the past net worth of surviving firms plus their total return on capital minus the
expected return (which is paid out in borrowing costs to the bank) on the externally financed part of their
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capital stock – equivalent to
nt = θnt−1 +
K
N
(cyt −Et−1cyt) +Et−1cyt + enwt (1)
where K
N
is the steady state ratio of capital expenditures to entrepreneurial net worth, θ is the survival
rate of entrepreneurs and enwt is a net worth shock. Those who die will consume their net worth, so that
entrepreneurial consumption is equal to (1− θ) times net worth. In logs this implies that this consumption
varies in proportion to net worth so that:
cet = nt (2)
In order to borrow, entrepreneurs have to sign a debt contract prior to the realisation of idiosyncratic
shocks on the return to capital: they choose their total capital and the associated borrowing before the
shock realisation. The optimal debt contract takes a state-contigent form to ensure that the expected gross
return on the bank’s lending is equal to the bank opportunity cost of lending. When the idiosyncratic shock
hits, there is a critical threshold for it such that for shock values above the threshold, the entrepreneur
repays the loan and keeps the surplus, while for values below it, he would default, with the bank keeping
whatever is available. From the first order conditions of the optimal contract, the external finance premium
is equated with the expected marginal product of capital which under constant returns to scale is exogenous
to the individual firm (and given by the exogenous technology parameter); hence the capital stock of each
entrepreneur is proportional to his net worth, with this proportion increasing as the expected marginal
product rises, driving up the external finance premium. Thus the external finance premium increases with
the amount of the firm’s capital investment that is financed by borrowing:
Etcyt+1 − (rt −Etπt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt) + eprt (3)
where the coefficient χ > 0 measures the elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage. Entrepreneurs
leverage up to the point where the expected return on capital equals the cost of borrowing from financial
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intermediaries. The external finance premium also depends on an exogenous premium shock, eprt. This
can be thought of as a shock to the supply of credit: that is, a change in the efficiency of the financial
intermediation process, or a shock to the financial sector that alters the premium beyond what is dictated
by the current economic and policy conditions.
Entrepreneurs buy capital at price qqt in period t and uses it in (t+ 1) production. At (t+ 1) entrepre-
neurs receive the marginal product of capital rkt+1 and the ex-post aggregate return to capital is cyt+1. The
capital arbitrage equation (Tobin’s Q equation) becomes:
qqt =
1− δ
1− δ +RK∗
Etqqt+1 +
RK∗
1− δ +RK∗
Etrkt+1 −Etcyt+1 (4)
The resulting investment by entrepreneurs is therefore reacting to a Q-ratio that includes the effect of the
risk-premium. There are as before investment adjustment costs. Thus, the investment Euler equation and
capital accumulation equations are unchanged from Le et al. (2011). The output market-clearing condition
becomes:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
∗ ky
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (5)
1.1 Modifications to the BGG model to allow effects of Quantitative Easing
and Bank Regulation
In the years since the crisis there have been key developments in the monetary scene. The first has been the
zero bound on official interest rates, as central banks have driven the rate at which they will lend to banks
down virtually to zero. The second development has been aggressive open market operations (‘Quantitative
Easing’), intended to inject liquidity into the banking system and spur greater credit creation. The third
has been more intrusive regulation of banks, via increased capital and liquidity ratios. It seems important
to us to introduce into the model here a tool to deal with each of these developments.
Let us begin with bank regulation: what this does is to raise the cost of lending to entrepreneur-firms,
or ‘firms’ for short – this is the credit friction. The regulations insist banks hold as counterpart funds for
the credit assets they hold, not purely deposits that have low cost but also in particular capital; the latter is
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more expensive because shareholders putting up such equity require an appropriate premium to compensate
them for the risk the banks’ losses will lose this capital. We do not model the regulations explicitly through
these balance sheet quantities but for simplicity put into the model an addition to the credit friction, ξ,
reflecting these requirements – and also the costs of other regulative intrusions1 .
Next, we consider the role of QE. To deal with this, we note that in BGG firms put up no collateral.
Net worth by construction is all invested in plant, machinery and other capital. However, once so invested,
this amount cannot be recovered at original value plainly: it will have less value as second hand sales when
the firm goes bankrupt because it has become specialised to the firm’s activities. The cost of bankruptcy
recovery (costly state verification) applies to the valuation of the activity this capital still allows.
It is in fact normal for banks to request an amount of collateral from the firms to which they lend. This
gives firms more ‘skin in the game’ and so more incentive to avoid bankruptcy. (Some models underpin bank
contracting entirely on the basis that banks will only lend against collateral – Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
– however we do not adopt this extreme position here.) We therefore supplement the BGG model by the
assumption that banks require firms to put up the amount of collateral, c, as a fraction of their net worth.
We also assume that recovery of this typical collateral costs a proportion, δ, of its original value when posted
– we can think of the example of a house being put up and it costing this proportion in fees and forced-sale
losses to sell the house and recover its value in cash. We modify the workings of the model according to
these two assumptions – these modifications are shown in an appendix.2
It is at this point we introduce the idea of cash as collateral. If a firm holds some cash on its balance
sheet, this can be recovered directly with no loss of value and no verification cost; thus it eliminates the cost
δ. We show in the appendix that the elimination of this cost lowers the credit premium for given leverage;
it therefore permits firms to increase leverage and so raise their expected returns. We therefore assume that
banks and firms have an interest in firms holding as much cash as can be acquired for collateral. Thus as
1 Such as ‘ringfencing’ different activities and imposing high liquidity ratios
2 The posting of collateral actually lowers firms’ profits from borrowing for given net worth and leverage; this is because
collateral has no yield and could be sold for higher profitable investment. Hence it seems to be puzzling that banks demand
collateral in a contract designed to maximise firms’ profits subject to the constraints of truth-telling and bank zero net profits
due to competition. However, undoubtedly collateral is a routine precaution taken by banks engaged in arm’s length lending.
The natural interpretation of collateral in this context is that it ensures that the borrower does not abscond; in the event of
absconding the collateral is directly seizable. Equivalent amounts are taken in numerous financial transactions as ‘deposits’,
‘margin’ and so on.
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M0 is issued we assume that it is acquired by firms from banks to be held as collateral. This effect of the
monetary base on collateral echoes Williamson (2013) in a search model.
The government/central bank issues this cash through open market operations (QE) to households in
exchange for government bonds they hold. They deposit this cash with the banks. Firms wish to acquire as
much of this cash as possible for their collateral needs. We can think of them as investing their net worth
in cash (to the maximum available), with the rest going into other collateral and capital. In practice of
course their profits (which create their net worth) are continuously paid out as dividends to the banks which
provide them with credit, so they have nothing with which to acquire these assets if they do not collaborate
with banks. So they achieve this balance sheet outcome by agreeing with the banks that, as a minimum
counterpart to the credit advanced they will hold the maximum cash collateral available, which is M0. Thus
all of M0 at once finds its way into firms’ balance sheets, where it is securely pledged to the banks in the
event of bankruptcy (for example by being actually lodged with them). 3
Finally, the short-term interest rate is set by the central bank according to some rule, such as the Taylor
Rule. In our model here only firms hold M0; households have no use for it and deposit it at once in banks
where as we have seen it is lent to firms to hold as collateral, in effect M0’s only use. In New Keynesian models
it is implicitly assumed that the Taylor Rule is enforced by open market operations of some sort, presumably
in money and Treasury Bills. Here we make the assumption that it is enforced by open market operations in
public debt; households hold part of their savings in government bonds, the rest in bank deposits, which pay
the short term interest rate also obtainable on Treasury Bills (treated here as an equivalent asset). Following
our general assumption of imperfect substitutability between different assets (in this we follow recent work
such as Swanson, 2011), we suppose that central banks’ sales of long-term government bonds for Treasury
3 One might ask: could not bank deposits be held as collateral? Consider first whether a firm collaborating with bank A
could hold deposits in bank B as collateral for its bank A credit. The problem for bank A would be that it would know bank B
would lend out these deposits to other firms against those firms’ collateral. Thus the average bank deposit has as its counterpart
asset bank credit, which is leveraged on firms’ collateral. If firms could hold other banks’ deposits as collateral, the banks as a
whole would have no collateral at all since effectively the ‘collateral’ would be lending to firms. Thus while an individual firm
deposit with another bank, on its own, could provide some collateral, the practice if allowed by a bank could open the system,
and so it too, to abuse. So it is plain that banks will not agree for bank deposits with other banks to be collateral.
Consider second whether a deposit of a firm with its own bank could be collateral. We can see that this is exactly equivalent
to the firm holding M0 (which is then held for it by the bank). Imagine firms hold the same part of their Net Worth as they
held M0 before, but now in the form of deposits with their own banks; it is agreed that this amount will not be invested but
held as collateral. Lending then goes ahead in the same amount as before but this part is held by the banks unlent, in a form
that can be fully seized. To do so the banks must hold M0 on their balance sheets, as this is the only asset that is fully seizable
– just as before when they held it on behalf of firms. In effect they invest the firms’ Net Worth in M0.
Thus in general we can think of M0 as the only available monetary collateral.
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Bills are used to enforce their interest rate target.4
This now gives our monetary authorities three instruments: ξ, M0 and r. Accordingly, apart from their
interest rate setting rule they will need two other operating rules for these instruments. We will discuss these
shortly.
First, we set out the balance sheets of the agents in the economy and discuss how they are altered by
acts of policy (see Table 1).
Firms Banks Households Govt/central bank
A L A L A L A L
( COLL− exM0−
COLL−M0+
K+
) (
NW
CR+
) (
CR+
) (
DEP+
) (
DEP+
GB−
) (
CUMSAV
) (
CUMDEF
) (
GB−
M0+
)
Table 1: Balance Sheets of the Agents of the Economy
where COLL= collateral (exM0=held as non-monetary; M0=held as money); K=capital investment;
NW=net worth; CR=credit; DEP=deposits; GB=government bonds; CUMSAV=stock of private savings;
CUMDEF=accumulated government borrowing; M0=monetary base.
Consider now how an open market operation (QE) by buying GB for M0 would change these balance
sheets – as indicated by + and − in this table. Households place the extra cash on deposit; the banks
then lend it to firms who are able to use it as collateral in a future lending deal with the banks, so that a
larger part of collateral is held as M0. With collateral cheaper (δ falls) the bank credit premium falls (which
will induce a future rise in investment and leverage); the other collateral is converted into capital stock.
These are the partial equilibrium or direct effects, which then lead to further general equilibrium changes in
response to the fall in the credit premium.
To adjust the model for these additional features, we need to introduce the effect of M0 on the credit
premium via its effect on the cost of liquidating collateral, δ; and we need to add ξ, the macro-prudential
instrument directly raising the credit friction, into the credit premium equation. We can think of ξ as being
like a buffer of M0 that the banks need to hold for reasons of liquidity, and that is hence unavailable for use
4 This type of open market operation, known as ‘operation twist’, is most familar in the context where the objective is to
lower long term interest rates by buying long-term bonds and selling Treasury Bills; this raises the prices of (lowers interest
rates on) long-term bonds and lowers the prices of (raises interest rates on) Treasury Bills. Here we focus not on the effect
on long-term bonds but on Treasury Bills. An open market operation of this sort to lower short-term interest rates has an
unfamiliar feel: the central bank must sell long-term bonds and buy Treasury Bills, so forcing up their price and lowering their
interest rate.
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as collateral; hence it is equivalent to negative M0. The credit premium equation now has additional terms
in m (=lnM0) and ξ, as follows:
Etcyt+1 − (rt −Etπt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt)− ψmt + ξt + eprt (6)
where ψ is the elasticity of the premium to M0 via its collateral role. This effect comes about, conditional
on leverage (k−n), through the willingness of banks (under their zero profit condition) to reduce the credit
premium for given leverage. Now that they will recover more in the event of bankruptcy, the equilibrium
contract, for given leverage, now has a lower bankruptcy threshold and a lower required rate of return on
firm assets. Both produce a lower credit premium for given leverage.
We now need equations for the supply of M0 and for the setting of ξ. QE programmes have sought to
raise money supply growth (and implicitly therefore credit growth); before these programmes M0 seems to
have been set to accommodate the supply of credit/broad money generated at the interest rates set by the
Taylor Rule.
Macro-prudential measures have been built on the Basel Agreements nos 1 and 2; clearly they have been
made more harsh over this period in response to the crisis, which was unpredicted by officials. Before that
there was a gradual tightening of regulation at least in the Agreements, if not always in practical application
by individual countries.
What these considerations suggest, as argued above, is that the supply of M0 was supplied via the
discount window, before the crisis when interest rates were above the zero bound, as required to support the
supply of money (M in logs); after the crisis, when interest rates were at the zero bound (which we take to
be 0.25% p.a.), M0 (i.e. QE) seems to have been targeting the credit premium around its steady state, cy∗,
aiming to bring credit conditions back to normal. For macro-prudential measures the above suggests that
they have evolved as an exogenous I(1) time-series process, with the crisis acting as an exogenous shock to
the process.
So we write the equation for M0 in two parts:
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mt = ψ0 + ψ1Mt + errm2t for rt > 0.0625% and ∆mt = ψ2(cyt − cy
∗) + errm2t for rt ≤ 0.0625%
where ψ1, ψ2 are both positive. The credit premium tends to be correlated inversely with the broad
money supply, so that one may think of this approximately as a policy of money targeting; however the
money element in the banks’ balance sheet fluctuates with other things and so from a welfare viewpoint it
is the credit premium that should be targeted with as much information on it as can be amassed, including
that from M itself.
We write the equation for the macro-prudential instrument as:
∆ξt = errxit
Given that we have very poor data on these macro-prudential measures we have to this point simply included
these in the error eprt.
Finally, we need an equation now additionally for the supply of money, which we define as equal to deposits
(= credit) +M0. Here we simply use the firms’ balance sheet (M = CR+M0 = K +COLL−NW +M0)
which can be written in loglinearised form as:
Mt = (1 + ν − c− µ)Kt + µmt − νnt
where M , K, m, n are respectively the logs of Money, capital, M0 and net worth, we have omitted the
constant (which includes collateral, assumed fixed as a proportion of money); ν, µ, c are respectively the
ratios of net worth, M0 and collateral to money.5
We treat the above model with money as a third version. The final step is to allow for the zero bound on
the government short-term bond rate. To do this we note that when this interest rate solves above 0.25%,
the Taylor Rule sets interest rates so that inflation is determined. The operative M0 equation is the one
5 Notice that in this model the demand for money is simply the demand for deposits as a savings vehicle. Savings in the model
are equal to investment by market-clearing, so that any additional investment requiring additional bank supply of leverage is
equal to the additional supply of savings.
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supporting the broad money supply.
However when interest rate solves for 0.25% or below it can fall no further than 0.25% and so it is set
at this level and the Taylor Rule is rendered inoperative; when this happens, the model retains inflation
determinacy because at some point in the future the model emerges from the zero bound and the Taylor
Rule is again operative. The operative M0 equation is the one targeting the credit premium.
The full model is given in Appendix 2.
2 The method of Indirect Inference
We evaluate the model’s capacity in fitting the data using the method of Indirect Inference originally proposed
in Meenagh et al. (2009a) and subsequently with a number of refinements by Le et al. (2011) who evaluate
the method using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach employs an auxiliary model that is completely
independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of the data against which the performance of
the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can be summarised either by the estimated parameters
of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we will call these the descriptors of the data. While these
are treated as the ‘reality’, the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated to find its implied values for
them.
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Smith, 1993, Gregory
and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al., 1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova, 2005). Here
we make a further use of indirect inference, to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated structural model.
The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series model. In estimation the parameters of the
structural model are chosen such that when this model is simulated it generates estimates of the auxiliary
model similar to those obtained from the actual data. The optimal choices of parameters for the structural
model are those that minimise the distance between a given function of the two sets of estimated coefficients
of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the actual coefficients, the scores or the impulse
response functions. In model evaluation the parameters of the structural model are taken as given. The aim
is to compare the performance of the auxiliary model estimated on simulated data derived from the given
estimates of a structural model – which is taken as a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis –
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with the performance of the auxiliary model when estimated from the actual data. If the structural model
is correct then its predictions about the impulse responses, moments and time series properties of the data
should statistically match those based on the actual data. The comparison is based on the distributions of
the two sets of parameter estimates of the auxiliary model, or of functions of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves first constructing the errors implied by the previously estimated/calibrated
structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors and are backed out directly from the
equations and the data6 . These errors are then bootstrapped and used to generate for each bootstrap new
data based on the structural model. An auxiliary time series model is then fitted to each set of data and the
sampling distribution of the coefficients of the auxiliary time series model is obtained from these estimates
of the auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether functions of the parameters of
the time series model estimated on the actual data lie in some confidence interval implied by this sampling
distribution.
The auxiliary model should be a process that would describe the evolution of the data under any relevant
model. It is known that for non-stationary data the reduced form of a macro model is a VARMA where
non-stationary forcing variables enter as conditioning variables to achieve cointegration (i.e. ensuring that
the stochastic trends in the endogenous vector are picked up so that the errors in the VAR are stationary).
This in turn can be approximated as a VECM (Appendix 3). So following Meenagh et al. (2012) we use
as the auxiliary model a VECM which we reexpress as a VAR(1) for the three macro variables (interest
rate, output and inflation, with a time trend and with the productivity residual entered as an exogenous
non-stationary process (these two elements having the effect of achieving cointegration). Thus our auxiliary
model in practice is given by: yt = [I − K]yt−1 + γxt−1 + gt + vt where xt−1 is the stochastic trend in
productivity, gt are the deterministic trends, and vt are the VECM innovations. We treat as the descriptors
of the data all the VAR coefficients and the VAR error variances, so that the Wald statistic is computed from
6 Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here to initiate the tests is the robust
instrumental variables estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data as
instruments and calculate the fitted values from a VAR(1) — this also being the auxiliary model chosen in what follows. Once
the search procedure (effectively indirect estimation) has converged on the best model parameters, we then move to generating
the expectations exactly implied by the parameters and the data, and use these to calculate the errors, which are then the
exact errors implied by the model and data. The reason we do not use this ‘exact’ method at the start is that initially when
the model is far from the data, the expectations generated are also far from the true ones, so that the errors are exaggerated
and the procedure may not converge.
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these. Thus effectively we are testing whether the observed dynamics, volatility and cointegrating relations
of the chosen variables are explained by the simulated joint distribution of these at a given confidence level.
The Wald statistic is given by:
(Φ−Φ)′
∑−1
(ΦΦ)
(Φ−Φ) (7)
where Φ is the vector of VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with Φ and
∑
(ΦΦ) representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated
across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the Φ is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and
the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribution7 . Such a distribution is
generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it is also shown to be consistent
by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statistic is ‘asymptotically pivotal’; they also showed it had quite
good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments8 .
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones (H0,
the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived, the test
then asks: could these coefficients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model generating the
data? Of course only one true model with one set of coefficients is possible. Nevertheless we may have chosen
coefficients that are not exactly right numerically, so that the same model with other coefficient values could
be correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coefficient values that are feasible within the
model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason we extend our procedure by a further search
algorithm, in which we seek other coefficient sets that minimise the Wald test statistic – in doing this we
are carrying out indirect estimation. The indirect estimates of the model are consistent and asymptotically
normal, in common with FIML – see Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith (1991, 1993), Gourieroux et al.,
(1993), Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
Thus we calculate the minimum-value Wald statistic for each model using a powerful algorithm based
7 The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are
preserved.
8 Specifically, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% confidence level
and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh et al (2012) found even greater accuracy in Monte Carlo experiments on nonstationary
data.
15
on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial values, with
optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space9 . The merit of this extended procedure
is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when finally doing our comparison of
model compatibility with the data.
We use Indirect Inference rather than the now widely-used Bayesian approach to estimating our model
here, because we wish to test the model as a whole against the data. Under the Bayesian approach one
assumes that the prior distributions and the model structure are correct; but because of well-known con-
troversies in macroeconomics, this is not an assumption we can (yet) make. Even a major model like the
Smets-Wouters (2007) model of the U.S., that was carefully estimated by Bayesian methods, was rejected
by our indirect inference test, see Le et al. (2011). Under uncertainty about the priors any model ranking or
probability assessment we made would be affected by the choice of priors. Thus our aim is to find a model
that we can say is not rejected by the data features, so that we can rely on it for discussions of policy; at a
later stage of analysis when such a model has been found to be generally reliable, one could progress to the
use of Bayesian methods in refining it.
For overall testing we could also have used the common Likelihood Ratio (LR) test instead of the Wald
test – a Bayesian test with flat priors (which might be used given lack of agreement on priors) amounts in
effect to an LR test. This test is examined carefully in Le et al. (2012) who find that the two methods test
quite different properties of the model in their check on its misspecification: the LR test is based on a model’s
in-sample current forecasting ability whereas the Wald is based on the ability of the model, including its
implied errors, to replicate the behaviour of the data, as found in the VAR coefficients and the data variances.
In effect the Wald test asks in a parsimonious way whether the model can replicate the impulse response
functions found in the data. This reflects our aims for the use of the model, to assess the impulse response
functions of policy shocks.
9 We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996). This mimics the behaviour of the steel cooling process in
which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the cooling process–this ensuring that the
defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in the chosen range and as points that improve the objective
are found it also accepts points that do not improve the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in local
minima. We find this algorithm improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used our
standard testing method: we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals from
the data using the LIML method, find their implied autoregressive coefficients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the implied
innovations with this full set of parameters to find the implied Wald value. This is then minimised by the SA algorithm.
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It turns out that the Wald has far greater power than the LR in the context of a macro model like the
one here; this property is demonstrated for the Smets-Wouters model by Le et al. (2012) whose comparative
table we reproduce next. Table 2 shows a Monte Carlo experiment with the SW model treated as true,
generating stationary data; this model is mis-specified by changing the parameters alternately by +/-x%
(see the original for full details). The rejection rate for the Wald rises sharply with x. Table 3 shows the
same exercise on non-stationary data that the power of the Wald remains very similar under non-stationarity
as we have in the model here.
Percent Mis-specified Wald LR
True 5.0 5.0
1 19.8 6.3
3 52.1 8.8
5 87.3 13.1
7 99.4 21.6
10 100.0 53.4
15 100.0 99.3
20 100.0 99.7
Table 2: Rejection Rates for Wald and Likelihood Ratio for 3 Variable VAR(1) with stationary data
3 variable VAR(1)-non-stationary data
Level of falseness Rejection rate
1% 34.1%
3% 55.2%
5% 90.5%
7% 100%
Table 3: Rejection Rates for Wald and Likelihood Ratio for 3 Variable VAR(1) with non-stationary data
3 Testing the model against the data
We now evaluate two versions of this model: one with the BGG banking sector; and one which further adds
the monetary base as collateral and switch between regimes without and with the zero lower bound. Each
model is reestimated by indirect estimation before its final test statistic is determined. It can be seen in
Table 4 that both models fail to be rejected at 95%, with p-values in excess of 0.05. Adding the extra features
slightly improves the p-value; hence bringing the model more closely into alignment with real-world features
does not damage the model’s coherence with the data.
In a later section we show key IRFs for the final model (i.e. in the final column) that we have developed
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Model Coefficients: 1984Q1-2011Q4
Model with
Banking alone
Model with
Banking and Money
Elasticity
of capital adjustment
ϕ 7.376 6.814
Elasticity of consumption σc 1.476 1.700
External habit formation λ 0.646 0.714
Probability of not changing
wages
ξw 0.813 0.627
Elasticity of labour supply σL 4.915 2.683
Probability of not changing
prices
ξp 0.882 0.973
Wage indexation ιw 0.943 0.354
Price indexation ιp 0.202 0.168
Elasticity of capital utilisation ψ 0.053 0.104
Share of fixed costs in
production (+1)
Φ 1.400 1.761
Taylor Rule response
to inflation
rp 4.266 2.375
Interest rate smoothing ρ 0.786 0.737
Taylor Rule response
to output
ry 0.036 0.025
Taylor Rule response
to change in output
r∆y 0.055 0.021
Share of capital in production α 0.156 0.178
Proportion of sticky wages ωw 0.444 0.442
Proportion of sticky prices ωr 0.066 0.090
Elasticity of the premium
with respect to leverage
χ 0.012 0.032
Money response to premium ψ2 N/A 0.065
Elasticity of the
premium to M0
ψ N/A 0.055
Money response to credit growth ψ1 N/A 0.043
WALD (Y, π,R) 21.263 21.9037
∗Fixed parameters p-value 0.0656 0.0686
Table 4: Coefficient Estimates (1984Q1-2011Q4)
18
here. We must emphasise that because of the differing monetary responses in the ‘non-crisis’ (no zero bound)
regime and the ‘crisis’ regime (zero bound) the responses under the two regimes differ materially. Under the
first, interest rate policy is active and M0 policy is supportive (i.e. M0 expands as needed to accommodate
rising M2, and vice versa); under the second interest rate policy is enforcedly inactive at the zero bound and
M0 policy is active in controlling the credit premium. Also under the first regulative policy was inactive
(and largely ineffective in the control of monetary conditions since M0 is supportive of M2; under the second
regulative policy was active though it is only modelled here as an exogenous error process and not a reactive
policy).
We will argue that welfare would be improved if monetary policy combined an interest rate rule (whenever
feasible) with an active M0 rule and if regulative policy were dropped. So one regime we will examine closely
in what follows is where these things are done – we will call it the ‘Monetary Reform’ regime. Improvement
would also come if the interest rate rule were targeting the price level, or even better nominal GDP.
4 Accounting for the Banking Crisis – how much could policy
setting avoid?
It is widely argued that there needs to be regulative intervention in order to prevent future crises by preventing
banks from lending excessively. We look at this argument in two ways through the prism of the model we have
constructed here. First we consider the actual causes of this particular crisis according to the model. Second,
we do a stochastic analysis in which we create many pseudo-histories to see how often purely banking shocks
(which we assume could be prevented by regulation) have produced a crisis; and also how much difference
banking shocks and banking transmission (which again we assume could have been controlled by regulation)
have made to the crises we could have had.
We analyse what the model says should happen in the economy during and after the Great Recession.
We use that charts that follow for main macro variables: output, inflation and interest rate.
In these charts we isolate ‘monetary factors’ in the great recession and in particular
a) two factors that were operating through banking transmission: net worth and the regulative shock to
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Figure 1: Shock decomposition for output for the period 2005-2011
the credit premium,
b) two factors that were due purely to monetary policy: the Taylor Rule and M0 and finally
c) all other factors (the Rest) which can be considered the normal causes of the ‘business cycle’.
Output (Figure 1) is dominated by net worth (creating bank leverage), regulatory shocks to banks
(deregulation before, followed by sharp tightening), and general business cycle shocks. Monetary policy
proper plays little part, by contrast with the standard model.
Interest rates (Figure 2)until the zero bound hits are dominated by the Taylor Rule and the general
business cycle, with smaller contributions from regulative and net worth shocks. The decomposition is
telling us that in the upswing before the crisis the credit boom was little restrained by the rise in interest
rates.
Inflation (Figure 3)is dominated by business cycle shocks. During this period inflation did not fluctuate
much except in response for raw material price shocks. The Fed’s implicit inflation target appears to have
anchored domestically generated inflation with great solidity.
The overall picture is of an economy enjoying a strong banking boom until the crisis, at which point the
same forces driving the boom went into reverse.
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Figure 2: Shock decomposition for interest rate for the period 2005-2011
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Figure 3: Shock decomposition for inflation for the period 2000-2011
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4.1 The causes of crisis
We can ask a further question: what is the nature of a crisis and what causes it, according to our analysis
of this sample? We define a ‘crisis’ as a severe interruption in output growth for at least three years and
a financial crisis as a crisis in which there is also a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
First, we examine this question by inspecting the bootstrap experience (potential scenarios over the period)
from the model and its shocks drawn from the period 1984—2007, during which massive financial shocks are
absent – we call these ‘standard shock scenarios’. Then we look at the bootstrap simulations with the full
sample of shocks 1984—2011 – we call these ‘crisis-inclusive shock scenarios’.
We find the following results:
1) Crisis is a normal part of the US economy: Crises are regular results from ‘standard’ shock scenarios.
The shocks from the financial crisis period are not necessary conditions for big economic recessions. Figures
4 and 5 show some examples of the bootstrap simulations.
We find that on average crises appear every 52 years. With crisis-inclusive shock scenarios, crises become
more frequent – every 48 years. However, qualitatively their behaviour is similar to the standard shock
scenarios illustrated below. The inclusion of crisis shocks adds to the shock volatility.
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Figure 4: Crises without financial crisis
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Figure 5: Crises with financial crisis
2) When there is a crisis, about half the time there is also a financial crisis where the nominal interest rate
is driven down to the zero lower bound – the charts above show some illustrations of each with standard
shocks. This ratio is the same when crisis-inclusive shocks are used.
3) Figure (5) shows that an extreme financial shock is not required to produce a financial crisis. This
follows from the fact that we generated financial crises simply using the standard shock scenarios. Including
crisis shocks simply adds to the frequency of crises as we have seen.
4) Financial shocks on their own are not sufficient to produce crisis. We created bootstrap scenarios
using only financial shocks but including the crisis. These scenarios did not produce any economic crisis.
What we see here is rather in line with the conclusions of Stock and Watson (2012) from a VAR factor
analysis of the period: that the financial crisis period did not have a bigger share of financial shocks generating
it than previous US business cycles. The shocks were just generally bigger. Thus we find the Great Recession
was a crisis and a financial crisis: but its triggers were the usual mixture of real and financial shocks.
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5 Implications of the model for policy
We begin with fiscal policy which many have argued holds the key to responding to crisis conditions. We
interpret it here as a government spending shock. Then we look at monetary policy and regulative policy.
Finally we consider possible changes to the monetary regime, which we divide into the initiation of a separate
rule for active M0 setting via open market operations, side by side with an interest rate rule – we call this
‘Monetary Reform’; and modifications of the interest rate rule where we consider Price Level Targeting
(PLT) and Nominal GDP Targeting (NGDPT).
5.1 Fiscal Policy (Responses to Government Spending Shock)
Figure 6 shows the fiscal multiplier effects in the standard non-crisis context where the Taylor Rule is
operating. We see the usual effects: a rise in inflation and interest rates (via the Taylor Rule) which
reduce (‘crowd out’) investment, while consumption rises very slightly on the prospect of higher future
output/income. Real wages rise with higher output and labour hours rise. Basically the rise in net output
is equal to the rise in government spending (other demand effects are very small) and is made possible
with a roughly constant capital stock by rising labour supply, through higher wages, and by higher capital
consumption (with rising capacity utilisation) which adds to gross GDP. With rising entrepreneurial net
worth, the credit premium falls and credit rises. The resulting impact fiscal multiplier is 1.3; beyond the
output directly produced to satisfy higher government demand the rise in capital consumption adds to gross
GDP, which raises the multiplier from 1.0 (on net GDP) to 1.3 (on gross GDP).10 There is no difference
between the multiplier before the crisis and that with the zero bound. Consumption rises very slightly more
under the zero bound but the key impact in raising their consumption at all is the substitution effect of higher
wages and labour supply which occur in order to permit the extra government spending to be converted into
output; this is the same across both regimes.
10 In recent empirical work a large multiplier has been found for tax cuts – eg Romer and Romer (2012). However, these
effects may well be the result of ‘supply-side’ effects of tax structure or even effects of inter-temporal income-shifting rather
than the ‘Keynesian multiplier’ effects we are discussing here. This model is not equipped to deal with those other effects.
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Figure 6: IRFs for a government spending shock to the non-crisis (solid) and crisis model (dashed)
5.2 Monetary Policy
5.2.1 Responses to Taylor Rule Shock.
Figure 7 shows the effects of an increase in the nominal interest rate. This is a quite standard picture, not
dissimilar from most New Keynesian models. The real interest rate rises, discouraging both consumption
and investment. This reduces output, hours and real wages. It also lowers entrepreneurs’ net worth, so
raising the risk premium which contributes to the further drop in investment; with lower net worth there is
distress borrowing from banks which leads to an accommodating rise in M0.
5.2.2 Responses to Quantitative Easing Shock
Figure 8 shows the effects of a rise in M0 under normal and crisis regimes. Under the normal regime the
effect is to lower the credit premium and set off an investment boom. This stimulates more output, higher
real wages/labour supply and more consumption. This in turn generates inflation and a response from the
Taylor Rule raising real interest rates and so limiting the rise in consumption. M0 accommodates the rise
in credit.
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Figure 7: IRFs for a Taylor Rule shock to the non-crisis model
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Figure 8: IRFs for a M0 shock to the non-crisis (solid) and crisis model (dashed)
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Under the crisis regime, there is also a fall in the risk premium and investment rises. But the Taylor
Rule response is cut out and this eliminates one offsetting mechanism to the stimulus. Instead, M0 gradually
reverses the stimulus in response to the falling risk premium.
Hence a stimulus to M0 has positive effects on output with or without the Taylor Rule, revealing that
there is more to monetary policy than the setting of the Fed funds rate: direct open market operations are
effective in this model in their own right.
5.3 Regulative Policy
5.3.1 Responses to credit premium shock (Macro-prudential policy)
More regulations, such as Basel 2 and 3, raise the credit premium. The effects of imposing more regulations
on banking businesses are approximated here by a credit premium shock. Figure 9 shows that a higher
credit premium under either crisis or non-crisis regimes results in lower output, consumption, investment,
net worth, capital, working hours and real wages. When the Taylor Rule is operating it offsets the impact
of regulative tightening; when the economy is at the zero bound, M0 expansion offsets it somewhat more
aggressively under the baseline model.
It is clear from these impulse responses that macro-prudential policy is feasible in principle. However
we do not pursue it here as a potential reform because for it to operate as a stabilisation tool regulative
policy needs to be set at a distortionary level, so that its tightness can be both raised and lowered. The
model does not readily supply a method for calculating its cost other than through the temporary effects
(on investment and output) shown in these responses. The distortionary cost comes through its long-term
effects on productivity through inhibiting intermediation. However, we will see in what follows that there
are alternative monetary regimes that can reduce instability; if so there is no case for using this distortionary
regime for this purpose.
5.4 Changes in the monetary regime
The Great Recession showed that an economy with inflation targeting alone struggled to cope with big
shocks to the economy and might even contribute to financial instability (Beckworth, 2014) and welfare
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Figure 9: IRFs for a premium shock to the non-crisis (solid) and crisis model (dashed)
losses because monetary policy was too tight (and may have been too loose in the boom that led up to
it). As a result of cutting nominal interest rates dramatically in response to big economic shocks, many
OECD countries are in the zero lower bound situation. New Keynesian economists have argued that this is
a liquidity trap situation, but the model shows that there is a strong impact of quantitative easing under
the zero bound. In this section, we discuss some possible changes to regulative and monetary regimes that
could improve economic stability, compared with the baseline regime (embedded in the model) of inflation
targeting, minimal regulation and a fairly weak M0 response to the credit premium.
Our main focus with these alternative regimes is their capacity to reduce the number of crises. We
also look at the more conventional measure of business cycle welfare cost, as measured by the weighted
sum of the variances (over the business cycle) of consumption and hours of work; we also look at a widely
used alternative measure, the weighted sum of the cycle variances of output and inflation. These measures
abstract from any changes in deterministic or stochastic trends, on the grounds that monetary policy cannot
affect these trends. Here we follow the usual practice of proxying these trends with an HP filter (applied to
each variable in each simulation).
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5.4.1 Monetary reform
One of the features of the run-up to the Great Recession was a substantial expansion of money and credit,
permitted by the inflation targeting regime. This came about because inflation did not respond much to
this expansion, anchored as it was by expectations that the inflation target would be effective. Yet since
monetary expansion has a stimulative effect on the economy, supplementing the interest rate rule with a
money supply rule could be helpful to stability. We now investigate how a monetary reform regime of this
type might work; we assume it is implemented in both non-crisis and crisis times. Here we supplement the
Taylor Rule with a powerful M0 rule responding to the credit premium with a response much larger than
in the baseline model. Figure 10 shows IRFs of model’s variables to a credit premium shock with (dashed
line) and without (thick line) the counteractive M0 rule. It can be seen that it stabilises investment and the
credit premium.
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Figure 10: IRFs from the credit premium shock under noncrisis model with monetary reform (dashed) and
non crisis model without monetary reform (solid)
The optimal monetary reform takes the following form
∆mt = 0.106 (st − s
∗)
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To measure its effect in stabilising the economy we perform a large number of bootstrap simulations over
the sample period and compute the average frequency of crisis as defined above, namely a drop of at least
3% in output where output does not recover to its previous peak for 3 years. This M0 rule brings down
the frequency from every 48 years in the baseline case to every 151 years – tripling stability. On the more
conventional measures of welfare it reduces them both substantially (see Table 5).
5.4.2 Price-level targeting regime
The zero lower bound situation and the recession associated with it has renewed interest in price level
targeting (PLT) as a better alternative monetary policy that can achieve price stability while also reducing
the impact of the zero lower bound (Wolman, 2005; Vestin, 2006; Nakov, 2008; and Dib et al, 2008; for
a recent survey see Hatcher and Minford, 2014). Under PLT, inflation expectations adjust to stabilise
the economy: if an unanticipated shock pushes the price level below the target, people will expect higher
than average inflation in the future to bring the price level back to the target. PLT has two advantages
over inflation targeting. First, due to the automatic adjustment in inflation expectations, the central bank
does not need to move interest rates aggressively in response to shocks (Cover and Pecorino, 2005), thus it
reduces the likelihood of hitting the zero bound. Second, PLT can generate positive inflation expectations
in a deflationary situation, lowering real interest rates even at the zero bound and so stengthen recovery.
The PLT rule is specified as follows:
rt = ρ1rt−1 + (1− ρ1)
{
ρπ (pt − p) + ρy(yt − y
∗) + ρ∆y [(yt − y
∗)− (yt−1 − y
∗)]
}
+ ert
Under the zero inflation steady state, the steady price level is assumed constant here and normalised as
p = 0.
We are looking for an optimal PLT specification that provides the least frequency of crisis under our
bootstrap simulations. The following PLT
rt = 0.545rt−1 + (1− 0.545) {1.745pt + 0.021(yt − y
∗) + 0.026 (yt − yt−1)}+ ert
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reduces crisis frequency to 464 years from the baseline 48. On the conventional measures it also improves
matters on a similar scale to monetary reform. Again it raises the variance of inflation, as intended (Table
5).
5.4.3 Nominal GDP targeting
A group known as Market Monetarists who run a widely-accessed blog on monetary policy, have been calling
for monetary policy to target the level of nominal GDP (NGDP), rather than either a monetary aggregate
or inflation (Sumner 2011, Nunes and Cole 2013). A similar proposal was made some time ago in a series of
papers by McCallum (1988) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) who suggested a rule setting interest rates in
response to deviations of nominal GDP growth from a target rate. McCallum argued that this rule would be
superior to monetary targeting because of the large and unpredictable changes in payments technology and
financial regulations. Compared with the later Taylor Rule McCallum’s rule has interest rates responding
as strongly to output growth deviations as to inflation deviations. However, Market Monetarists argue for
targeting the level of NGDP rather than its growth rate; the reasons are similar to those for PLT, except
that in this case a expected future interest rate stimulus is triggered also by output falling below its trend
(McCallum, 2011). A concern about this is that with a stochastic productivity trend monetary policy would
be affected by permanent shifts in productivity; thus the NGDP rule we use here allows for changes in
the model’s productivity trend – since this is hard for the central bank to estimate, the results for the
NGDP rule shown here are ‘best case’. Nevertheless, if this best case can be assumed, the NGDP rule
generates expectations of very strong monetary responses in conditions of prolonged recession – analogous
to Roosevelt’s 1930s abandonment of the Gold Standard (Krugman, 2011; Carney, 2012 and Woodford,
2012).
Implementing the NGDP target, the central bank would specify an intermediate target for the official
interest rate. The rule might be written as follows:
rt = ρ1rt−1 + ρy(yt + pt − yt − p) + ert
where y + p is the target for NGDP, where p = 0 and yt follows the trend path in real output generated by
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productivity.
Given this general rule, we bootstrap our model and implied shocks to see whether implementing the
NGDP targeting regime could help to stabilise the economy. We found that the rule in of form of
rt = 0.859rt−1 + 1.827(pt + yt − yt) + ert
reduces further the frequency of crisis to 541 years, from PLT’s 464. Measured by the conventional welfare
measures NGDPT does better than PLT if one uses the one with output variance and worse if one uses the
one with consumption variance (Table 5).
5.4.4 Combining PLT or NGDPT with monetary reform
We also consider the alternative monetary regimes where the central bank combines price level targeting or
nominal GDP targeting with the M0 rule. Table 5 brings all these results together. It shows that crises are
reduced further under either combination; of the two the PLT+Monetary-Reform combination outperforms
the NGDPT combination on the standard welfare cost measure if one uses the measure with consumption
variance and underperforms it on the measure with output variance.
There is no unambiguous winner from these suggested regimes. Both the PLT and NGDPT combinations
offer a big rise in stability with a slight rise in inflation variance (the standard deviation of the annualised
inflation rate rises by 0.2%). If one wishes to minimise inflation variance the best way to increase stability
is the straight NGDPT regime on its own; but with NGDPT on its own or in combination the central bank
needs to assess the productivity trend correctly, which may cause difficulties. In the last row we show the
frequency of zero-bound episodes; this is not so much a measure of stability for the economy, as for the
policy regime. The regime that minimises zero bound episodes is again NGDPT, with or without monetary
reform; the frequency then comes down to one episode every 70 years.
We have shown below charts of several crisis episodes, to illustrate how these different regimes work to
increase stability. As one can see, in all cases the new regimes inject stabilising action when the economy
surges or collapses. Also it is quite apparent (as it is from Table 5 of stability measures) that all the regimes
operate in a broadly similar way, with similar quantitative effects. The reason they are so similar is that
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all of them are ‘integral control’ mechanisms; that is to say, they all react to a measure of the level of
the economy’s state relative to its target level and their reaction in all cases is to move yields (either the
government interest rate or the private credit rate or both) until the state gets close to target.
Base
case
Monetary
Reform
PLT NGDPT
PLT+
Mon.
Reform
NGDPT+
Mon.
Reform
Frequency of crisis (expected
crises per 1000 years)
20.8 6.62 2.15 1.83 1.41 1.31
Exp welfare cost (1)∗ 1.43 0.65 0.662 0.657 0.646 0.663
var(cons) 0.498 0.151 0.121 0.121 0.117 0.124
var(hours) 0.932 0.499 0.541 0.536 0.529 0.539
Exp welfare cost (2)∗ 2.652 0.563 0.576 0.558 0.564 0.526
var(output) 2.619 0.544 0.522 0.54 0.512 0.474
var(inflation) 0.033 0.019 0.054 0.018 0.054 0.052
Frequency of zero bound
(per 1000 years)
34.8 20.2 21.2 14.1 20.7 13.9
∗equal weights for each variance
Table 5: Frequency of crisis and stability under different monetary regimes
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Figure 11: Simulated output under different rules (example 1)
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Figure 12: Simulated output under different rules (example 2)
6 Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to remedy the lack of a role for money in prevailing DSGE models. The route we
choose is to give money a role in providing cheap collateral in a model of banking; this means that monetary
policy can affect the risk-premium on bank lending to firms by varying the supply of M0 in open market
operations. This effect comes on top of the usual rate-setting of the safe interest rate done via the Taylor
Rule in normal times. But it implies that even when the zero bound prevails monetary policy is still effective;
it also implies that fiscal policy, which has a modest multiplier effect in normal times, does not enjoy a ‘free
lunch’ in crisis times due to the zero bound, as it still crowds out investment via the risk-premium which
remains unbounded from below.
Though this model is based on standard DSGE foundations, its message is similar to that of models
promulgated by ‘monetarists’ such as Friedman, Brunner and Meltzer: that the quantity of money matters
and cannot be ignored in favour solely of an interest-rate-setting rule. For the ECB it justifies the existence of
a ‘second pillar’. For central banks generally, it suggests that money supply growth needs to be controlled,
over and above the setting of the safe interest rate for inflation targeting reasons, in order to maintain
control of credit and avoid credit booms and busts. We suggest a simple rule for making M0 respond
to credit conditions that can substantially enhance the economy’s stability. Both price-level and nominal
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GDP targeting rules for interest rates would combine with this to stabilise the economy further; of the two
PLT offers the safest route as it is not dependent on assessing the productivity trend and it also achieves
a similar scale of gain. If these rules for monetary control were instituted, they would make aggressive
regulation of banks’ balance sheets, such as has recently been promoted, redundant; since such regulation
involves raising the credit premium in a distortionary way, avoiding it in favour of monetary control would
be welfare-enhancing.
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7 Appendix 1: Augmenting the BGG model for collateral and
money
The assumptions added to BGG are that the banks demand collateral as a proportion of net worth of c; and
that liquidating this collateral costs δ per unit of collateral. The BGG model consists of three parts:
a) a bankruptcy threshold at which firms will choose to default
b) banks’ zero profit condition (free entry drives profits to zero) – this condition gives us the banks’
leverage offer curve.
c) firms’ maximisation of utility subject to a) and b); this gives us the overall contract.
Now we look at each part in detail:
a) the bankruptcy threshold (ω; ω is the return obtained per unit of assets, distributed as a random
variable with a mean of unity): this is such that the firm is indifferent between defaulting and staying in
business. If it goes bankrupt, it loses (1 + RK)ωA + cN and it gains ZB. Here Z=1+credit rate and B=
bank borrowing; A is total investment, RK = the firms’ return on investment, and N= net worth of the firm.
Thus at the threshold ZB = (1+RK)ωA+ cN . Note also that the firms’ balance sheet is B = A−N + cN ;
thus when this condition holds:(1 +RK)ωA+ cN = Z(A−N + cN). Let L = A/N= Leverage. Divide the
condition by N and obtain: Z = (1+R
K)ωL+c
L−1+c
b) banks’ zero profit condition is given by
[1− F (ω)]ZB + (1− µ)G(ω)(1 +RK)A+ cNF (ω)(1− δ) = (1 +R)B
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On the left hand side the first term is the probability of obtaining the loan proceeds (ZB), where F (ω)
is the probability of going bankrupt. In the second term G(ω) is the expected value of the returns per unit
asset to be made if the firm goes bankrupt times the probability of bankruptcy; this is reduced by the cost
of collection, µ. Finally, there is the recovery of collateral in the event of bankruptcy minus its liquidation
cost δ. On the right hand side is the cost of the funds the bank has received from depositors at the riskless
rate, R.
Substitute from the bankruptcy threshold ZB = (1 +RK)ωA+ cN in the first term of the LHS and on
the RHS for B from firms’ balance sheet B = A−N + cN.This gives:
[1− F (ω)](1 +RK)ωA+ (1− µ)G(ω)(1 +RK)A+ cN(1− δF (ω)) = (1 +R)(A−N + cN)
Let Γ(ω) = [1− F (ω)]ω +G(ω). Divide by N to obtain:
[Γ(ω)− µG(ω)](1 +RK)L = (1 +R)(L− 1) + c(1 +R− 1 + δF (ω)) so that we obtain:
L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK) where Ψ(ω) = Γ(ω)− µG(ω)
This is the banks’ leverage offer curve. It can be readily verified that it slopes upward and is convex in
[1− Γ(ω)] space – as shown in the diagram below.
Note that dL/dω > 0, dL/dRK > 0, dl/dδ < 0
c) To obtain the overall contract firms’ utility (returns), relative to their cost of funds, are maximised.
These are given by:
∞∫
ω
{(1+RK)ωA+cN−ZB}dF (ω)
N(1+R) ; now also note that from the bankruptcy threshold ZB = (1+R
K)ωA+ cN .
So it can be seen that the firms’ returns are unaffected by the existence of collateral, essentially because
it remains as part of their gross return if they do not go bankrupt but also, for given total assets A, the
borrowing costs at which they will choose to go bankrupt rise by the amount of this collateral.
Substituting into the returns from the bankruptcy threshold gives the overall returns as:
∞∫
ω
{(1+RK)(ω−ω)A}dF (ω)
N(1+R) =
(1+RK)
(1+R) L[1− Γ(ω)] where the first two terms give the total expected return to
the firm from its invested capital (A) as a proportion of its funds, N(1+R) and the last term [1 − Γ(ω)] is
the share of this that goes to the firm (the bank takes the loan costs if the firm survives and the returns
below ω if it does not).
This utility function gives indifference curves in (ω,L) space, that are concave. An interior optimum is
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reached.
Banks' Leverage 
offer curve
ω
ω*
L* L
Firms' 
Indifference 
Curves
Figure 13: The optimum contract for (ω¯∗, L∗) for given Rk, R, δ
We can compute this optimum by maximising (1+R
K)
(1+R) L[1−Γ(ω)] wrt (ω,L) subject to the leverage offer
curve from the banks L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)(from b above). Solving for the implicit function this gives in ω
gives us finally the firm’s optimum choice of ω as the solution of:
{1 +R− c[R+ δF (ω)]}{1 +R−Φ
′
(1 +RK)} = {−cδF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′(ω)
}{1 +R−Ψ(ω)(1 +RK)}
where Φ
′
= Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′(ω)
+ (1− Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′(ω)
)Ψ(ω) ≈ 1
In addition we have the leverage offer curve defining L in terms of ω and so giving us the total (ω,L)
solution.
We can now create two equations in (ω,L) from the firm’s optimum and the banks’ leverage offer. We
can rewrite the firm’s optimum choice using the banks’ leverage offer as:
1) L{1 +R−Φ
′
(1 +RK)} = {−cδF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′ (ω)
}
and then we can add the banks’ leverage offer:
2) L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
We now investigate the comparative static properties of changes around the equilibrium by taking the
total differential of this two-equation system in dL, dω, dδ and dRK . We will evaluate the derivatives at an
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equilibrium where δ = 0; we do this for convenience because we will be dealing with a heavily monetised
collateral set-up where it is close to zero. Note that in the rest of the DSGE model lnLt=kt−nt is determined
while δ is determined by the provision of M0 as an alternative to illiquid collateral. Thus we can regard these
as exogenous to this banking model subsector which then solves for ω and RK (the return on capital required
to make the needed leverage possible). These two elements are internal to the bank contract decision and
unobservable in the public domain but in turn from these we can solve for the observable cost of the bank
credit, Z, from the bankruptcy threshold as Z = ((1+R
K)ωL+c
L−1+c .
We write the total differential as:
1) {1 +R−Φ
′
(1 +RK)}dL+ L(−Φ
′
)dRK = (derivative = 0)dω + {−cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′(ω)
}dδ
and
2) dL = L{ Ψ
′
(ω)(1+RK)
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)}dω + L{
Ψ(ω)
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)}dR
K + { −cF (ω)]1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)}dδ
Our interest lies in the effect of δ on the equilibrium value s of RK and ω, and thus on Z. We begin by
noting from 1) that
dRK
dδ
= { cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ′Γ′ (ω)
} = { cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ′ [1−F (ω)]
} ≻ 0
and from 2) that:
dω
dδ
= dω
dRK
.dR
K
dδ
+dω
dδ
= { −Ψ(ω)
Ψ′ (ω)(1+RK)
}{ cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ′Γ′ (ω)
}+ cF (ω)
LΨ′(ω)(1+RK)
= cF (ω)
LΨ′(ω)(1+RK)
{1−F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′Γ′ (ω)
}
= cF (ω)
LΨ′(ω)(1+RK)
{1− F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
} since we note that Γ
′
(ω) = [1− F (ω)].
The sign of the last total derivative is strictly ambiguous and needs to be computed numerically. Consider
a bankruptcy rate around 2.3% and a standard normal distribution of lnω (i.e. with a standard deviation of
unity, so that the bankruptcy threshold will be exactly two standard deviations below the mean). ω will then
take the value of 0.135 (=e−2); F (ω) = 0.023; F
′
(ω)
F (ω) = 2.3;Ψ(ω) ≃ Γ(ω) = [1−F (ω)]ω = 0.13x0.977 = 0.127
since G(ω) ≃ 0; it also follows as noted above that Φ
′
= Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′ (ω)
thus {1 − F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
} = 0.73 and so
is clearly positive for any values around that size of bankruptcy rate and standard deviation. The reason
essentially is that the banks’ share of returns,Γ(ω), is under the assumed competitive nature of banks quite
modest; and so a rise in the rate of return has only a modest effect on profits while a rise in the bankruptcy
threshold has a much larger effect. Hence at zero profits with given leverage the trade-off of threshold given
up for extra required rate of return is small.
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Finally, we find
dZ
dδ
= L
L−1+c{[1 +R
K ]dω
dδ
+ ω dR
K
dδ
} = c
L−1+c
{
F (ω)
Ψ′ (ω)
{1− F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
}+ {ωF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
}
}
> 0, on
the assumption that dω
dδ
> 0 as above.
Thus finally since δ is reduced by M0 injections we can conclude that a rise in M0 will reduce the required
return on capital and also the credit premium.
8 Appendix 2: Model Listing
Consumption Euler equation
ct =
λ
γ
1 + λ
γ
ct−1 +
1
1 + λ
γ
Etct+1 +
(σc − 1)
W∗L∗
C∗(
1 + λ
γ
)
σc
(lt −Etlt+1)−

 1− λγ(
1 + λ
γ
)
σc

 (rt −Etπt+1) + ebt (8)
Investment Euler equation
innt =
1
1 + βγ(1−σc)
innt−1 +
βγ(1−σc)
1 + βγ(1−σc)
Etinnt+1 +
1(
1 + βγ(1−σc)
)
γ2ϕ
qqt + einnt (9)
Tobin Q equation
qqt =
1− δ
1− δ +RK∗
Etqqt+1 +
RK∗
1− δ +RK∗
Etrkt+1 −Etcyt+1 (10)
Capital Accumulation equation
kt =
(
1− δ
γ
)
kt−1 +
(
1−
1− δ
γ
)
innt +
(
1−
1− δ
γ
)(
1 + βγ(1−σc)
) (
γ2
)
(ϕ) (einnt) (11)
Price Setting equation
42
rkt = ω
r


1
α
(
1
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
)((1−βγ(1−σc)ξp)(1−ξp)
ξp((φp−1)ǫp+1)
)


πt −
βγ(1−σc)ιP
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
Etπt+1 −
ιP
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
πt−1 +
(
1
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
)
(
(1−βγ(1−σc)ξp)(1−ξp)
ξp((φp−1)ǫp+1)
)
((1− α)wt − eat)− ept




+(1− ωr)
[
eat
α
−
1− α
α
wt
]
(12)
Wage Setting equation
wt = ω
w


βγ(1−σc)
1+βγ(1−σc)
Etwt+1 +
1
1+βγ(1−σc)
wt−1 +
βγ(1−σc)
1+βγ(1−σc)
Etπt+1 −
1+βγ(1−σc)ιw
1+βγ(1−σc)
πt
+ ιw
1+βγ(1−σc)
πt−1 −
1
1+βγ(1−σc)
(
(1−βγ(1−σc)ξw)(1−ξw)
(1+ǫw(φw−1))ξw
)
(
wt − σllt −
(
1
1−λ
γ
)(
ct −
λ
γ
ct−1
))
+ ewt


+
(1− ωw)
[
σllt +
(
1
1−λ
γ
)(
ct −
λ
γ
ct−1
)
− (πt −Et−1πt) + ew
S
t
]
(13)
Labour demand
lt = −wt +
(
1 +
1− ψ
ψ
)
rkt + kt−1 (14)
Market Clearing condition in goods market
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
∗ ky
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (15)
Aggregate Production equation
yt = φ
[
α
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + αkt−1 + (1− α) lt + eat
]
(16)
Taylor Rule
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rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ) (rpπt + ryyt) + r∆y (yt − yt−1) + ert for rt > 0.0625 (17)
Premium
Etcyt+1 − (rt −Etπt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt)− ψmt + ξt + eprt (18)
Net worth
nt =
K
N
(cyt −Et−1cyt) +Et−1cyt + θnt−1 + enwt (19)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (20)
M0
∆mt = ψ1∆Mt + errm2t for rt > 0.0625 and ∆mt = ψ2(cyt − cy
∗) + errm2t for rt ≤ 0.0625
M2
Mt = (1 + ν − µ)kt + µmt − νnt (21)
9 Appendix 3: VECM
Following Meenagh et al. (2012), we can say that after log-linearisation a DSGE model can usually be
written in the form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 +C(L)xt +D(L)et (A1)
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables which we assume are driven by
∆xt = a(L)∆xt−1 + d+ c(L)ǫt. (A2)
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The exogenous variables may contain both observable and unobservable variables such as a technology shock.
The disturbances et and ǫt are both iid variables with zero means. It follows that both yt and xt are non-
stationary. L denotes the lag operator zt−s = L
szt and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial functions with roots
outside the unit circle.
The general solution of yt is
yt = G(L)yt−1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)ǫt. (A3)
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt and xt are non-stationary, the
solution has the p cointegration relations
yt = [I −G(1)]
−1[H(1)xt + f ]
= Πxt + g. (A4)
The long-run solution to the model is
yt = Πxt + g
xt = [1− a(1)]
−1[dt+ c(1)ξt]
ξt = Σ
t−1
i=0ǫt−s
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt = x
D
t + x
S
t has a deterministic trend x
D
t = [1− a(1)]
−1dt and
a stochastic trend xSt = [1− a(1)]
−1c(1)ξt.
The solution for yt can therefore be re-written as the VECM
∆yt = −[I −G(1)](yt−1 −Πxt−1) + P (L)∆yt−1 +Q(L)∆xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)ǫt
= −[I −G(1)](yt−1 −Πxt−1) + P (L)∆yt−1 +Q(L)∆xt + f + ωt (A5)
ωt = M(L)et +N(L)ǫt
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Hence, in general, the disturbance ωt is a mixed moving average process. This suggests that the VECM can
be approximated by the VARX
∆yt = K(yt−1 −Πxt−1) +R(L)∆yt−1 + S(L)∆xt + g + ζt (A6)
where ζt is an iid zero-mean process.
As
xt = xt−1 + [1− a(1)]
−1[d+ ǫt]
the VECM can also be written as
∆yt = K[(yt−1 − yt−1)−Π(xt−1 − xt−1)] +R(L)∆yt−1 + S(L)∆xt + h+ ζt. (A7)
Either equations (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliary model. Here we focus on (A7); this distinguishes
between the effect of the trend element in x and the temporary deviation from its trend. In our models
these two elements have different effects and so should be distinguished in the data to allow the greatest test
discrimination.
It is possible to estimate (A7) in one stage by OLS. Meenagh et al. (2012) do Monte Carlo experiments
to check this procedure and find it to be extremely accurate.
Our DSGE model here is non-linear since it comprises two regimes between which the economy shifts
according to the shocks hitting it. In this respect it is similar to the original models estimated by Smith
and others under indirect inference, which was intended by them to overcome the difficulty that the model
was non-linear and so could not be estimated by the usual direct inference methods. As they showed, an
auxiliary model that is not the reduced form of the true model but simply some linear representation of the
data behaviour yields an indirect inference estimator of the DSGE parameters that is still asymptotically
normal and consistent.
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